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ABSTRACT
With the rapid growth of Web 2.0 technologies, users are
contributing more and more content on the Internet, in the
form of user profiles, blogs, reviews, etc. With this increased
sharing comes a pressing need for access control policies and
mechanisms to protect the users’ privacy. Access control has
remained largely centralized and under the control of the
web applications hosted on their servers. Moreover, most
web applications either provide no or very primitive and
limited access control. We argue that the owner of any piece
of data on the web should be able to decide how to control
access to this data. This argument should hold not only
for the web applications contributing data, but also for the
contributing users. In other words, users should be able to
choose their own access control models to control the sharing
of their data independent of the underlying applications of
their data.
In this work, we present a novel framework, called xAc-
cess, for providing generic access control that empowers
users to control how they want their data to be accessed.
Such a control could be in the form of user-defined access
categories, or in the form of new access control models built
on top of our framework. On one hand, xAccess enables
individual users to use a single unified access control across
multiple web applications; and on the other hand, it allows
an application to support different access control models de-
ployed by its users with a single model abstraction. We
demonstrate the viability of our design by means of a plat-
form prototype. The usability of the platform is further
evaluated by developing sample applications using the xAc-
cess APIs. Our results show that our model incurs minimum
overhead in enforcing the generic access control and requires
negligible changes to the application code for deployment.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of Web 2.0 technologies, web applica-
tion development has become much more distributed with a
growing number of users acting as developers and sources of
.
online contents. In particular, many users are contributing
more and more contents, by providing their personal infor-
mation on social networks or by adding information in the
form of blogs, reviews, etc.
While the trend is towards more user-contributed data,
the mechanisms to define the access control policies on user-
contributed data are still under the control of the web ap-
plications. Consider the example of social networks such as
Facebook. Users contribute data in the form of their profile
information, by loading pictures, or by posting messages in
each other’s profiles. The mechanism to control access to the
users’ data is determined by the social networking web site;
in most cases, it is limited to a small number of pre-defined
access categories such as private, public or to providing ac-
cess only to the users’ friends. As a result, the users are
forced to use alternate means to protect their privacy, for
example, by maintaining multiple blogs [16].
Even if a web site or application wants to change its access
control mechanism to satisfy the needs of its users, there are
major obstacles. First, the diversity in the user population
and the variety of the data contributed by each user means
that developing a mechanism that caters to the need of every
user might not be feasible. Second, even though the privacy
expectations that users desire are easy to state, there is still
a large gap between users’ mental models and the policy
languages of the current access control systems provided by
the applications [4].
We argue that the users are the ones best suited to decide
the semantics and importance of their own data. Thus, we
need to provide users the freedom and utility to define the
access control policies specific to their data, and enable web
applications to enforce these potentially diverse policies.
In this paper, we propose a generalized framework for pro-
viding access control in web applications that provides users
with a wide range of access control options to satisfy their
own individual privacy requirements and is independent of
any application. In our design, the users have the flexibil-
ity to define their own policies to control the privacy of the
data contributed by them. A simple example of such user-
specific policies for a blogging application is that of a blog-
ger defining different access to his blog for personal friends
and office colleagues. Another user of the same application
may only desire public or private access for his blog entries.
Our framework provides an abstract base model to which
the user’s access control policies can be mapped: this sin-
gle, unified abstraction allows the modeling of a wide range
of access control policies specified by different users of an
application.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Application architecture for: (a) current frameworks. (b) xAccess framework.
We demonstrate the viability of our design by implement-
ing a prototype system, called xAccess. xAccess has two
components, one that runs on the client side as an exten-
sion to the user’s browser and another component that is
hosted on the server of the web application. A user desir-
ing access control for his data defines his policies using an
interface provided by the xAccess extension. The extension
translates these user policies to categories in our base access
control model. Our model is based on the Role Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) scheme, so these categories translate
to specific roles in the model. xAccess also provides an inter-
face to apply the user-defined policies to any granularity of
data desired by the owner, for example, to protect individ-
ual blog entries, particular personal information, or specific
photos. Furthermore, xAccess also allows specific words or
phrases within a blog to be tagged with user-defined cat-
egories, thereby allowing data owners to control access to
specific information, such as someone’s name in a blog en-
try. Only a user who wants to control access to his data is
required to install the xAccess’ browser extension; the exten-
sion is not needed by any other user who is seeking access to
the owner’s data. For the rest of the paper, we use the term
owner to denote an individual providing data and seeker to
denote a person who wants access to the owner’s data.
The server-side component of xAccess uses the access cat-
egories of the base model to determine whether a particular
access should be granted. Our model not only controls ac-
cess to the read operation, but also supports access control
to other operations like write or download. In a blogging
application, the server-side component filters a blog consid-
ering the categories attached to various parts of the blog.
By default, a reader is only presented with the public en-
tries of an owner’s blog. Further access is granted only after
the owner’s policy specifies a category label for the reader
and the access is limited to that category. In a wikipedia
application, the owner can similarly restrict write operation
to his wiki entry by attaching appropriate write permission
to the entry.
One of the strengths of xAccess’ abstract model is that it
allows other access control models to be incorporated into
our framework. This is a desirable feature, because we ex-
pect other current and future access control models to fa-
cilitate development of more diverse user policies closer to
an owner’s mental model. Our base model is generic and
can simulate a wide range of such models (Section 3.2). For
example, in the blogging application, new models such as
CBAC [14] can support policies like “only people mentioned
in the blog should see the blog”. Our framework supports
such models, thereby supporting more diverse user policies,
without requiring any change to our base model and without
any modifications to the web application.
1.1 Limitations of Current Designs
The current access control design of web applications en-
forces an application-specific single security policy for every
user of that application. However, there are different de-
grees of intimacy between an individual and any other user
desiring access to his data, but the current designs are too
coarse to capture these distinctions. In most current access
control systems, the owner of data has no say in defining the
granularity of access allowed.
These coarse-grained policies might result in undesired ac-
cess or undesired restrictions. For example, users on Flickr
only have the option to assign their office colleagues to the
category of family, friends, or public. Assigning them public
access would prevent them from viewing some of the “pro-
fessional” pictures posted by the user. On the other hand,
giving them friends access would allow them to see any pic-
tures accessible to friends, which might not be desirable for
some users. On the flip side, some users might not want to
share some of the professional pictures with a few or all of
their friends or family due to confidentiality constraints. The
web application is ill-equipped to decide the access granular-
ity required by a particular owner; only the owner is familiar
with his own particular situation and relationships to pro-
vide the right level of access to other users in the system.
Most web applications currently employ limited number of
access control categories with little or no flexibility in adding
new user-specific categories.
The web application is also restricted in terms of the ac-
cess control mechanism it uses. In the current setting, most
applications provide a single access control model for all
users of the application (Figure 1(a)). For example, Face-
book uses access control lists to evaluate access to a user’s
profile, photos, messages, etc. This mechanism is common
for all the users, independent of individual requirements.
Additionally, the mechanism is more-or-less fixed and there
is no incentive for web applications to change the model un-
less there is a huge user base vouching for that change. As a
result, new innovative mechanisms such as CBAC [5] might
take years before being adapted by the web applications.
Even if some applications are more proactive to the change,
it does not hold true for most web applications.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our framework design allows an owner to keep a single
access control model that can be utilized for one or multiple
web applications (Figure 1(b)). However, the owner also has
Figure 2: xAccess Architecture and workflow scenarios.
the option to use different models for different applications.
For example, the framework empowers the owner to deploy
access control mechanisms like MAC [24] or CBAC [14] al-
lowing him flexibility in writing his own access control poli-
cies. From any web application’s prospective including the
ones that currently do not employ access control, one-time
installation of our framework enables the application to sup-
port different access control models for different owners.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel design of an access control frame-
work for supporting diverse user-defined access con-
trol policies that empowers the users to choose their
own models and their own access granularity. We also
show that our model is generic to allow simulation of
a number of popular access control models on top of
our framework, and provides enormous flexibility to
the users in making access control decisions about the
data owned by them.
• We develop a proof-of-concept system, called xAccess
(extended Access), that provides a set of APIs that
can be used to integrate generalized access control ca-
pability into web applications.
• We demonstrate the viability of our framework by de-
veloping a sample blogging application as our base ex-
ample and subsequently integrating access control into
the application using the xAccess APIs. We also show
real-world deployment potential of our framework by
integrating xAccess into a popular open-source wikipedia
application. Our sample web applications are available
online [1, 3].
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. We present an overview of the xAccess framework
in Section 2. We present the base model for access control in
xAccess in Section 3. Section 4 presents the implementation
details and evaluation of xAccess. We discuss the advantages
and limitations of xAccess in Section 5. Related work is
presented in Section 6, followed by conclusions in Section 7.
2. THE XACCESS FRAMEWORK
xAccess is a framework for enabling web applications to
capture and model data owners’ privacy policies and to en-
force such policies via access control on data seekers. xAc-
cess is designed to be general and adaptive so that it can
be used for a wide variety of web application scenarios and
more importantly for different access control models implied
by owners’ diverse policies. More specifically, xAccess only
requires one-time installation at the server side; after this
initial installation, no change is required at the server and
owners are free to change their policies via a client side com-
ponent at any time. Furthermore, xAccess provides a gener-
alized access control model, based on the Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) model [12, 25], to represent policies speci-
fied either in the form of user-defined access classifications
(such as private, friends, family, etc.) or in the form of
other access control models (such as MAC [24], DAC [23],
CBAC [14], etc).
Figure 2 shows a high-level design of the xAccess frame-
work. There are two parts of the xAccess platform, one that
is hosted on the server-side and the other that runs on the
client-side as an extension to the data owner’s web browser.
On the client-side, the xAccess extension provides a layer
of abstraction that enables its RBAC-based generalized ac-
cess control model (which we call base model) to directly
represent policies specified in terms of user-defined access
categories as well as convert policies specified using other
access control models. As we will show in Section 3.2, widely
used access control models, including Discretionary Access
Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role
Based Access Control (RBAC), can be constructed on top
of the base model in xAccess. These models are simulated
in xAccess by setting various parameters of the base model
using the APIs provided by xAccess.
More generally, as shown in Figure 2, any owner-specific
access control model, e.g., CBAC, is deployed as a layer
above xAccess and utilizes its APIs. When deployed, such
a model is coupled with xAccess in a web browser exten-
sion. If no such access control model is already designated
by a data owner, which is the more common case, xAccess’
browser extension presents a user interface that allows him
to define access categories directly into the base model. Ad-
ditionally, the browser extension also provides an interface
for a data owner to assign categories to any information
he puts in a web application. This interface forms part of
the browser’s chrome and does not modify the application’s
code. It supports access control for both structured informa-
tion (such as well-defined fields in a user’s personal profile)
and unstructured data (such as blogs). The xAccess exten-
sion only needs to be installed at the owner’s web browser,
and is not required for any other user only seeking access to
the owner’s data.
The mapping of the entities (both subjects and objects)
with their corresponding categories is passed to the applica-
tion’s server. The server-side component of xAccess receives
and stores these mappings. The xAccess component is a
separate module on the server side; it is only invoked by
the web application when required to filter content that is
access controlled (Figure 2). The amount of modifications
required to integrate xAccess into an application is negligible
(3–5 lines of API calls).
The enforcement of access control is done by the server
side component of xAccess, which serves all users of the
application and in effect realizes their corresponding access
control models. Since the translation of user-specific access
control models to xAccess’ base model is done at the client
side and only the access categories corresponding to the base
model are presented to the server, this greatly simplifies
the access control enforcement at the server side. xAccess’
server-side component uses a simple matching algorithm to
decide if a requesting subject (seeker) is allowed to access an
owner’s data object. The algorithm uses categories of the
subject and the object in making such a decision. We present
details of this algorithm when we introduce our model in
Section 3.1.
In our current design, the server side of xAccess is in-
voked as a set of API calls made by the web application.
An alternate design would be to deploy xAccess as a proxy
that filters data before passing it to the user’s browser. The
difference from our current design is subtle and a detailed
comparison is not the focus of our work.
3. USER-CENTRIC ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we present the generic access control model
that underlines our xAccess framework. We call this the base
model. It has the following design goals:
• Generalization. Since one of the goals of the xAc-
cess framework is to allow data owners to specify their
access policies, which can be very diverse, the base
model should be able to accommodate a wide range of
access control models. That is, it should allow policies
defined using different access control models to be ex-
pressed or simulated in the base model. It should also
model policies expressed in terms of access categories,
as commonly used in web application scenarios.
• Minimum modification requirements. Once a
web application deploys the xAccess framework, it should
require no further changes to the application even if a
data owner changes his access model at any later time.
• Backward compatibility. Even after deploying the
xAccess framework, an application should still sup-
port users with no xAccess component installed on the
client-side. In other words, the fall-back mechanism of
xAccess should be the same (default) behavior of the
application when no xAccess is deployed.
In order to achieve these goals, we designed xAccess to
be policy neutral. The base model in xAccess provides an
abstraction of the essential elements of any access control
policy, which would at the minimum include the access cat-
egories or role hierarchies, and the constraints and admin-
istration of user-role and role-permission assignments. We
next describe the base model, and show how it enables di-
verse user policies to be modeled and enforced in the xAccess
framework.
3.1 The Base Model
We constructed our model by customizing the Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) model for our user-centric paradigm.
The central idea of RBAC is that permissions are associated
with roles and users are made members of appropriate roles
thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions. Roles are created
for the various job functions in an organization, and users are
assigned roles according to their responsibilities and qualifi-
cations. The roles are assigned by the system administrator
of the organization. RBAC allows for the specification and
enforcement of a variety of protection policies, which can
be tailored on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis. The RBAC
framework provides administrators with the capability to
regulate who can perform what actions, when, from where
and in what order.
The goal of the xAccess framework is to provide protec-
tion to user data in accordance with the access control de-
fined by the data owner. In this regard, user’s contributed
data (i.e., user profile, blogs, photos, etc.) for a particu-
lar web application represents a habitat that corresponds
to an organization in the RBAC model. In our model, we
associate the administrator privileges for the access control
over any data items to the owner of those items. The data
owner defines the roles for his “system”because he is the one
who knows the “responsibilities and qualifications” of vari-
ous individuals, acting as users of the application, from his
personal connections to people. For example, a data owner
knows who his family members are in real life and how much
each person can be trusted with his data. In other words, a
role in our model signifies a real-life relationship of the data
owner. This relationship could be in the form of family,
friends, business colleagues, public or any others role spe-
cific to the data owner. Such roles might vary from user to
user. There is many-to-many mapping from roles to users;
this also shows similarity to the the real world, where an
individual might have multiple friends or family members,
or a friend could also be part of the family thereby assuming
both roles.
In RBAC, a role signifies a set of operations that can be
performed by that role. In our model, these operations can
take limited forms depending on the application. In most
cases, the operation would be limited to data read, allow-
ing a data owner to control the confidentiality of his data.
Some typical applications include social networks and blogs.
In other cases, the data owner might want to assign write
permissions to the data contributed by him. Wikipedia is
one application that falls into this category. Providing ac-
cess control for other operations such as direct download,
remote execution, etc. is also feasible in our system, if such
operations are supported by the application.
The xAccess framework tracks and enforces access control
using a labeling system defined based on the existing RBAC
models [12,25]. All system abstractions are layered on top of
two types of entities – subjects and objects. Subjects repre-
sent the users requesting data access and objects represents
the data entities that are being requested. Both subjects
and objects correspond to roles in the xAccess framework.
Subjects are associated with roles when the request for ac-
cess is granted by the web application on behalf of the data
owner. The objects are assigned roles when data is entered
into the application by the data owner, e.g., by uploading
new photos, writing new blog entry, adding new profile infor-
mation, etc. A data owner can update roles of both subjects
and objects anytime at his own discretion.
3.1.1 Formal Description
For any user u of a particular application A, an xAccess
system consists of a set of subjects Su ⊆ SA and a set of
objects Ou ⊆ OA, where SA is a set of all registered users of
the application and OA represents a set of objects allowed for
the application. OA includes both structured (e.g., user pro-
file) and unstructured (e.g., blog entry) data items specific
to the application A.
Additionally, a data owner u’s generic access control model
allows access to a set of roles Ru ⊆ R and the corresponding
permissions P (r) associated with each role r ∈ Ru. Here, R
represents a complete set of possible roles created by a data
owner according to his real-life relationships. Let us assume
that the application A permits operation set OPA(T ) for
any data seeker (who logs into the application) requiring ac-
cess to a component T of another user’s data. T represents
a unit of data with unique allowed operations and depends
on the internal logic of a particular application. For exam-
ple, user profile and blog entry represent two such example
components. An application, say A, may allow a user to
edit his own profile, but only allows reading of other user’s
profile, thereby implying OPA(profile) = {read}. However,
it may allow both read and write operations on the blog
(OPA(blog) = {read,write}). COMP (o) represents the ap-
plication component that contains object o.
Therefore, for an application A and any role r ∈ Ru, the
operations that any seeker can perform on data owner u’s
data object o is a set Peffective(r, o) = P (r)
⋂
OPA(COMP (o)).
Both subjects and objects are associated with set of one or
multiple roles, defined by the function role : Su → Ru for
subjects and role : Ou → Ru for objects of data owner u.
Basic Access Rule A subject s ∈ Su can perform
an operation op on an object o ∈ Ou if and only if ∀r ∈
role(s),∃r′ ∈ role(o) such that r = r′ and op ∈ Peffective(r, o).
3.1.2 Role Hierarchy
Roles can have overlapping responsibilities and privileges,
that is, users belonging to different roles may need to per-
form common operations on some objects. For example, a
best friend should be able to read the data accessible to a
friend’s role. Furthermore, often there are a number of data
items that can be accessed by all roles in their system. As
such, it would prove inefficient and administratively cumber-
some to repeatedly add access to these objects for each role
that gets created. To overcome this limitation, our model
includes specification of role hierarchies. A role hierarchy
defines roles that have unique attributes and that may “con-
tain” other roles. That is, one role may implicitly include
the operations, constraints, and objects that are associated
with another role. Role hierarchies are a natural way of
organizing roles to reflect authority and responsibility, and
competency.
An example of a role hierarchy is shown in Figure 3. In
this example, the role Private “contains” the roles of Best
Friend and Family. This means that members of the role
Private are implicitly associated with the operations, con-
straints, and objects of the roles Best Friend and Family
without the administrator having to explicitly list their at-
tributes for the Private role. The most powerful roles are
represented at the top of the diagram with the less powerful
roles being represented at the bottom. That is, the roles on
the top of the diagram contain the greatest number of oper-
ations, constraints, and objects. As shown in Figure 3, not
all roles have to be related. The roles Friend and Family
are not hierarchically related but they can contain some or
all of the same roles.
For a data owner u, role hierarchy RHu ⊆ Ru×Ru is as a
partial order relation on Ru, written as . That is, if r1  r2
then role r1 is higher than (or contains) role r2. We define
our access control rule in presence of the role hierarchy as
follows.
Hierarchy Access Rule A subject s ∈ Su can per-
form an operation op on an object o ∈ Ou if and only if
∀r ∈ role(s), ∃r′ ∈ role(o) such that r  r′ and op ∈
Peffective(r, o).
Considering the example hierarchy in Figure 3, let us as-
sume that a subject u1 with role(u1) = {Family,Best Friend}
wants to access (read) a photo object o1 with role(o1) =
{Friend}. The application allows only read permission to o1.
Since the role of the subject u1 (Best Friend) is higher than
the object o1 (Friend) and Peffective(Best Friend, o1) = {read},
u1 can successfully access the photo o1. As another example,
let us consider another user u2 with role(u2) = {Friend}
who wants to write to a blog entry o2 with role(o2) =
{Public}. In this case, the application allows both read
and write permissions to o2. Even though the role of u2
(Friend) is higher than o2 (Public), u2 is still not allowed
to write to o2 since Peffective(Friend, o2) = P (Friend)
⋂
OPA(COMP (o2)) = {read}
⋂
{read, write} = {read}.
xAccess allows new constraints to be added into the model
at any stage. Constraints are set of rules that are mandated
over any role assignments and hierarchy definitions. They
define a broad scope of what is acceptable in the xAccess
model. For example, a user may want to enforce a rule
that none of his office colleagues can be on his family list.
This ensures that information about his family activities or
family pictures are kept hidden from his office colleagues.
Accordingly, a constrain can be added using the xAccess
APIs that enforces that no user can be assigned the twin
roles of Family and Office Colleague at the same time.
Note that xAccess enforces no restriction on what roles
can be defined. It only provides a framework that can be
utilized to define roles and role hierarchies that can effec-
tively simulate the access control model underlying the user-
defined access control policies. Section 3.2 will discuss how
our base model can simulate the commonly used access con-
trol models, thereby enabling a generic access control system
for diverse user and application needs.
The server-side framework of xAccess stores the roles for
both subjects and objects associated with each user, the
hierarchy of roles, as well as the corresponding allowed op-
erations such as read or write for each role. It also enforces
the access control rules on behalf of the data owner. Fig-
ure 4 shows the algorithm used in the xAccess framework
to evaluate whether or not to grant access to the seeker for
Figure 3: Example role hierar-
chy in xAccess. Text in italics
represents corresponding per-
missions.
Algorithm 1 Access Control Algorithm of xAccess.
INPUT S: subject, O: object, REQ OP : operation requested
if application supports REQ OP on O then
Rs ← getRoles(S)
Ro ← getRoles(O)
for all r ∈ Rs do
for all r′ ∈ Ro do
if r  r′ and REQ OP ∈ getOperations(r) then






DENY S with REQ OP access to O
Figure 4: Pseudo code of the algorithm to check if the Subject S
can perform operation REQ OP on Object O. REQ OP can be in
the form of read or write on any other application-specific opera-
tion. getRoles(x) returns the roles corresponding to the entity x and
getOperations(y) returns the permissions for the role y.
the requested data item or resource. The algorithm covers
Hierarchy Access Rule with the condition r  r′. Replacing
this condition with r = r′ will limit the algorithm to support
only the Basic Hierarchy Rule. The simplicity of this algo-
rithm demonstrates the value of our design where a single
algorithm is able to effectively cover a wide range of access
control models used by different data owners.
3.2 Expressiveness of the Base Model
One of the requirements of the xAccess framework is that
it should allow users to choose their own access control mod-
els. In order to fulfill this requirement, the xAccess base
model should be generic enough to capture the functional-
ity of the chosen access control model. In other words, the
abstractions in the base model should be expressive enough
to enforce a wide range of access control models.
For most current web pages, access control is enforced
by just customizing the access levels or categories and by
providing partial order to such categories. For example, in
Facebook such categories are friends, friends of friends, pri-
vate, etc. These simple policies can be directly modeled by
the base model in xAccess. However, we anticipate that
future web applications may require more elaborate access
control policies.
In this section, we discuss how our RBAC-based model
can simulate the other access control models. In particu-
lar, we consider few traditional and most commonly used
access control models–Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Lattice Based Access
Control (LBAC) [10,24]–and their variants, along with some
newer models like Content Based Access Control (CBAC) [14].
3.2.1 DAC
Discretionary Access Control or DAC is a means of re-
stricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects
and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are dis-
cretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access
permission is capable of passing that permission on to any
other subject. Sandhu et al. demonstrated that several vari-
ations of DAC can be simulated via the RBAC model. The
basic idea behind the DAC to RBAC construction is to sim-
ulate the owner-centric policies using roles that are associ-
ated with each object [23]. In our framework, the owners
have discretion to transfer certain controls (read, write or
execute) to other users. In our default setup, transfer of
controls is allowed only if the original owner provides own-
ership permission to other users. Depending on his own
requirements, the owner can create additional permissions
to restrict transfer to only specific controls.
3.2.2 MAC / LBAC
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) refers to a system of
access control that assigns security labels or classifications to
objects and allows access only to subjects with distinct levels
of authorization or clearance. In contrast to DAC, where a
subject can pass permissions to access an object to other
subjects, no such propagation is allowed in the MAC model.
These controls are enforced by the security administrator of
the base system.
Lattice Based Access Control or LBAC is a special type of
MAC where a lattice is used to define the levels of security
that an object may have and that a subject may have access
to. A subject is only allowed to access an object if the
security level of the subject is greater than or equal to that
of the object. For example, in the xAccess system, a user
can give different levels of access to top friends, friends or
family. Based on how the lattice is constructed, LBAC can
be used for confidentiality, integrity, or both.
Osborn et al. have demonstrated that the LBAC model
can be simulated using RBAC [21]. Since our base model
is a customized form of RBAC, any variations of the MAC
model can be transformed to our base model. In our model,
an owner acts as the administrator for his own data repre-
senting the system administrator in the MAC model.
3.2.3 CBAC
CBAC is a type of access control in which access to an
object is partially or entirely based on the content of the
objects in the system [5, 22]. CBAC allows users to spec-
ify a single, intuitive access control policy based on object
features and then automatically applies that policy to new
objects as they are created. CBAC utilizes techniques from
natural language processing [22], image processing [5] and
machine learning to perform this task. Essentially, it pro-
vides the necessary bridge between a user’s intuitive access
control policy, such as “Parents should not see my party
pictures”, and the policy enforcement.
CBAC is currently an open research project, with efforts
to improve its practical acceptability to a variety of appli-
cations [14]. The advantage of CBAC is that it reduces the
burden of managing the access control policies for the users –
the users just need to provide high-level policies and CBAC
controls the policy enforcement with no further intervention
required from the user.
The advantage of our xAccess framework is that it allows
CBAC to be integrated into a web application easily using
our abstractions. It would also enable easy integration of
CBAC into the application at any time in the future, i.e.,
whenever users think that it is viable enough for their pur-
poses. Note that xAccess places no guarantee or control over
the correctness of CBAC; the users are empowered to decide
whether or not to use the CBAC systems. An alternative to
our approach in the current systems is that the applications
themselves switch to the CBAC model. However, applica-
tions have to cater to the need of all its users to consider a
new technology and hence might take much longer to switch
to the new CBAC model. Furthermore, switching to a new
model again limits all users of the application to that model.
To deploy CBAC on top of our xAccess framework, the
implementation of CBAC need to convert high-level user
policies in their model to lower level roles, subjects and ob-
jects in the xAccess model. For example, let us consider
a simple CBAC policy “Only my friends can see my party
pictures”. First, the CBAC implementation uses image pro-
cessing to determine which pictures are from “parties” and
tag all such pictures with a “friend” role. The user could
have approved a list of individuals to be added in the friend
role. More advanced implementations of CBAC can analyze
the user’s data to infer the friend’s list of the user based on
who talks with whom.
Since the CBAC policies can be effectively implemented
using RBAC, we can infer that the CBAC model can be
simulated using the xAccess system.
3.3 Access Control Lifecycle in xAccess
We can now summarize the process by which any access
control model defined by a data owner by means of the client
(browser) component of the xAccess framework is mapped
to the enforcement of access control at the server.
1. In the absence of any access control model specified by
the user, xAccess uses its own base model by default.
The xAccess’ browser extension presents a user inter-
face to the data owner for defining his access prefer-
ences directly into our model. This interface allows the
data owner to create roles and the corresponding role
hierarchy. Alternatively, the data owner may choose
to deploy his own access control model over xAccess
(Figure 2). Such models implement their access con-
trol logic by defining roles and roles hierarchies using
the APIs provided by xAccess’ browser extension. Or-
thogonally, the implementation of these models can
provide their own interface for the owner to define the
model-specific policies. We believe that user-friendly
interfaces can be developed by third parties to allow
easy configuration of access control policies, which is
both intuitive and easy to understand for the users;
the usability aspect of such interfaces is beyond the
scope of this work.
2. For each data entity – both structured and unstruc-
tured – input by a data owner to an xAccess-compatible
web application, the data owner has the option to at-
tach a category. Such categories are pre-defined based
on the access control model specified in Step 1. For the
default base model, these categories correspond to the
set of defined roles. If any other access control model
is used, any category attached to a subject or an ob-
ject is transformed to its corresponding role in the base
xAccess model. For example, the CBAC model allows
user policies like “My parents should not see my party
pictures”. The CBAC system has the capability to de-
termine if a particular picture is a party picture based
on the its pixel contents [14]. A typical CBAC inter-
face provided to a picture’s owner would allow him to
upload the picture to the web application. The CBAC
system accordingly tags the picture by passing a role
mapped to the “party picture” category to the xAccess
extension. Finally, the mapping of the entities with
their corresponding roles is passed to the application’s
server to be stored by the server-side component of
xAccess.
3. Any user of a particular web application can view the
default public information (i.e., public profile, public
blog, etc.) of all other users. However, in order to ac-
cess non-public information, the seeker sends a request
for access to the owner of that information. This logic
is internal to the application and is similar in most
typical applications.
4. A data owner sees all the access requests from other
users, and associates categories to each requesting user
according to the access control model and the cate-
gories chosen by him in Step 1. The assignment of
roles to the requesting users is conveyed to the server-
side of xAccess. Again, this procedure is aligned with
most existing applications where a user needs approval
from a profile’s owner before accessing the profile.
5. The requesting seeker can now access the data of an-
other user (the data owner) in accordance with the
roles assigned to him. The access control enforcement
is done by the xAccess component on the server side
using the algorithm given in Figure 4.
6. A data owner can modify the category of any of the
objects contributed by him and any of the subjects ap-
proved by him, effectively changing the access allowed
to these subjects.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Prototype System and Applications
We developed a working prototype of the xAccess system,
which includes the server-side platform code and APIs for
integrating the access control framework into the web ap-
plications. We also implemented the labeling model that
provides the required abstraction at the server so that any
Figure 5: Blog example with sample xAccess API implementation.
access control model implemented at the browser side for the
data owner can be enforced. Our xAccess platform consists
of about 2500 lines of Javascript code.
We demonstrate the viability of our approach by means
of two sample applications. First, we developed a blogging
application in-house that stores the profile information for
users and provide them the functionality to write their per-
sonal blogs. Second, we use a popular open-source wikipedia
application, called mediawiki, to show the applicability of
our system directly to existing applications. By default,
these applications have open access with any user logged
into the application being able to view the profile and data
(blogs/wikis) contributed by other users. In order to show
the feasibility of our approach, we integrated the xAccess
platform into the server side of these applications. This
integration represents one-time installation of our xAccess
framework for any application supporting the generic access
control models. We also showed that such an integration
incurs minimal changes to the existing code of the applica-
tions; the change comprises of few xAccess API calls to filter
the data being passed to the user.
On the browser side, we developed a sample proof-of-
concept access control model that allows a user to design
his own customized hierarchy of access control. The sam-
ple model is developed as a browser extension and has been
tested for Firefox 3.5. Using the extension, users can per-
form addition, deletion or modification of new categories of
access and customize the hierarchy graph of these defined
categories. Our xAccess framework maps these user-defined
categories to the abstractions at the server side using the
APIs given in Appendix A. The example blogging appli-
cation and the wikipedia application integrated with our
xAccess framework can be accessed online at [3] and [1]
respectively.
To handle unstructured data such as blogs and wikis, our
extension allows users to attach a category by selecting text
on their browser window. This enables the user to select
complete or part of the blog or the wiki. A new identifier
tag is attached to the selected text and the corresponding
identifier to category mapping is stored.
Figure 5 shows a partial overview of our server-side imple-
mentation by means of our blogging application example. In
this example, a user user1 has three subjects, namely alice,
bob and charlie, which the user has assigned categories of
Friend, Family and Private, respectively. He has defined
the role hierarchy for his system as given in Figure 3. xAc-
cess stores numbered representation for the role hierarchy in
its database. Taking an example, role Private (represented
as 1) has two children Best Friend and Family, labeled as
1 ∧ 1 and 1 ∧ 2, respectively. By separately storing the role
hierarchy, we allow modification of the hierarchy without
requiring any changes to the roles already assigned to the
subjects and the objects.
Let us assume that the user makes a blog entry saying
“I am going to Hawaii for a conference for vacation” and
wants to provide different purpose of his travel to friends
and family. The user tags parts of the blog with different
categories to achieve his purpose using the default interface
provided by the xAccess extension. The modified text is
stored in the application’s database and the corresponding
categories in xAccess objects’ database table. By tagging
the text with identifiers instead of the actual roles, xAccess
facilitates access modifications on the text objects without
changing the actual text stored with the application.
For any user accessing this blog, the server side of the
application invokes the filterString() API of the xAccess
platform (Appendix A) before passing the returned value
to the requesting user. Note that this requires addition of
only one line to the application code. filterString() filters
the blog entry by invoking xAccess’ access control algorithm
according to the roles assigned to the individual text objects
and the requesting subject. As we can see from Figure 5,
different readers have their own views of the blog based on
their assigned roles. While alice sees the entry as“I am going
to Hawaii for a conference”, charlie can view the whole blog
entry as his Private role is higher in hierarchy to both tags
Friend and Family attached to different parts of the entry.
We use similar text tagging method to control access for
structured data that are text fields, even though the inter-
face provided to the user is different. For non-text fields
Application Component Operation Number of
Application Latency
access checks Mean Std Dev
User Profile (structured) Read 12 37.1ms 0.83ms
Blog Entries (unstructured) Read 5 16.9ms 0.60ms
Wiki Entries (unstructured) Read 5 1.8ms 0.18ms
Wiki Entries (unstructured) Write 5 5.8ms 0.46ms
Table 1: User latency of various operations in typical web applications with xAccess.
such as photos, the categories are assigned to the filenames.
The web application uses the isAccessAllowed() API to
verify if access is allowed, before passing these entities to
the requesting seeker.
4.2 Performance Estimates
xAccess does not impose a substantial burden on the per-
formance of the web applications. Without being able to
deploy the framework to a real-world application setup, it
is difficult to accurately predict the impact of our design on
the performance of these applications as perceived by the
users. To get a rough estimate of the cost of supporting the
xAccess design and the overhead involved in our system,
we conducted some experiments with our sample applica-
tions, measuring the latency introduced by added security
provided by xAccess’ access control mechanisms.
In our experiments, the xAccess server is hosted on a
2.4GHz Intel Quad Core 2 machine with 4GB of RAM. The
requests are made from Firefox 3.5 browser on a 2.33GHz,
2GB RAM, Pentium Core Duo laptop. Each test was run
10 times and measurement values were averaged. We de-
fine user latency as the difference in the time when the re-
quest is made at the browser and the time at which the
response is received by the browser. Table 1 shows the la-
tency introduced for various user interactions for the sample
applications. Each interaction performs a different amount
of processing based on the number of access control checks
made for the interaction. For example, the number of checks
required for the user profile is fixed at 12, one each for every
profile field. On the other hand, the filtering of the blog (or
the wiki) depends on the number of different access control
tags added by the user in the unstructured blog (or wiki)
entry. In our tests, each of the sample blog and the wiki en-
try had 5 such access checks. Our results show that the user
latency for applications employing xAccess for providing ac-
cess control is still considerably low: when averaged over
the number of access checks, the latency is about 3.1ms for
structured user profile fields and 3.4ms for the unstructured
blog. For the open-source wikipedia application, providing
access control for the unstructured wiki incurs an average
latency value of 0.4ms for read and 1.2ms for write opera-
tion.
Studies have shown that acceptable user latencies fall in
the range of 50–150 ms [26]. All user latencies observed in
our experiments currently fall within this range. However,
the latency increases with the number of checks added by
the user. We emphasize that our prototype implementa-
tion is written in Javascript with no emphasis on optimiza-
tion. There are many opportunities for improving the per-
formance in our system, by optimizing the database queries
or by utilizing server-side caching. Moreover, on a cluster
of commercial servers with much better computational ca-
pacity, these values will be even smaller. Although it is
not possible to precisely determine the cost of our approach
without a large scale experiment, both the details of our
design and the results from these experiments, support the
conclusion that xAccess design imposes additional latency
within acceptable limits.
5. DISCUSSION
The support for both structured data (e.g., user’s profile)
and unstructured data (e.g., blogs) improves the ability of
our framework to be acceptable in more diverse applications
and environments. As previous research has suggested [13],
ability to apply user-defined policies to a more finer grained
level, such as words or phrases in blogs, satisfies a key ac-
cess control requirement in the Web 2.0 paradigm. Other
potential applications of our framework include email com-
munication and newsgroups where a sender is passing mes-
sages to multiple receivers, either to anonymous groups or to
unmanageably huge lists. Our framework allows the sender
to attach desired access control tags to different parts of a
message without explicitly identifying each receiver and cre-
ating separate individual messages. The filtering in turn is
done by the sender’s email server.
It might be argued that our design of pushing the access
control models to the user’s client might limit the mobility of
the data owner, i.e., the ability to retrieve his access control
preferences from the browser of any machine. However, the
solution to this limitation could be trivial: since the web
application is already storing the roles and role hierarchy for
the user, it can allow downloading of such preferences to the
user’s client after login. Moreover, this is only required if the
user wants to use a new machine to modify his access control
preferences. In case no such modifications are desired by the
user, he can normally browse the web application with no
need for xAccess’ browser extension.
While our abstraction model of access control can sim-
ulate a wide range of access control models and, in conse-
quence, the variations of these models [6,17,18,29], there is
still a possibility that our design might restrict some other
models that cannot be mapped directly to the abstractions
presented by our framework. Since RBAC is policy neutral
and research has shown its ability to successfully simulate
various other models [15, 21, 23], and since our model is a
variation of RBAC, we believe that our model also has the
ability to cover many other popular access control models.
We plan to evaluate the compatibility of our base model ab-
stractions with other access control models as part of our
future work.
6. RELATED WORK
Access control is a well established area of research and
previous work in this field range from creation of new mod-
els [6,10,24] to improving improving various aspects of these
models [17–19, 29]. In this work, our focus is not on creat-
ing yet another all-purpose access control model but is on
developing a generalized framework to allow such models to
be integrated into web applications.
Access control for web applications and services is an area
that has been well studied in the literature [7,9,20]. While
such centralized solutions are well suited to the web ap-
plications, their design is limited in the changing Web 2.0
paradigm towards user-contributed data. Our work is more
user centric allowing users to contribute in defining the ac-
cess control for their own data.
The need for user-defined policies for user applications is
being understood [13, 27]. PinUP is one system that allows
users to manage file access of his own applications in an iso-
lated environment specific to the user [11]. In another work,
Simpson has argued that the users of social networking sites
should have the opportunity to construct fine-grained access
control policies that meet their particular requirements and
circumstances [27]. Chinaei et. al proposed a decentralized
access control system in which corporate policy can allow
all health record owners to administer access control over
their own objects [8]. Our work is not specific to any type
of application and can be integrated into a wide range of
web applications, including social networks, content sharing
sites, and many others.
Gates has proposed use of access control based on the
real-world relationships of users [13]. In agreement with our
work, she also favors access control decisions to be made
by the users regarding access to their data. She further
argues the access control policies and relationship groups
defined by the user should follow the user, rather than be
redeveloped for each individual site. While her ideas relates
to some of the work described in this paper, there is no real
implementation of the ideas presented in her work.
There are some proposed solutions that allow inter op-
erability between diverse web applications by using user-
centric identities for access control mechanism. Lockr is an
access control system based on social relationships that lets
people manage their social networks by themselves in one
place (e.g., through their personal address books) while let-
ting web sites and Internet systems be in charge of content
delivery only [28]. This eliminates the need for users to
maintain many site-specific copies of their social networks.
Similar protection is achieved by the single sign-on decen-
tralized model of OpenID [2].
7. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a generic access control framework, called
xAccess, that allows users to control how they want their
data to be accessed. On one hand, xAccess is generic enough
to enable users to choose their own access categories and on
the other hand, it also supports integration of other access
control models to further increase the diversity of policies
available to the users. Our framework allows users to utilize
a single unified access control across multiple web applica-
tions. From an application’s prospective, it enables the ap-
plication to support different access control models deployed
by its users using a single model abstraction.
We developed a working prototype of the system and
showed its viability by integrating two sample applications
with our framework using the xAccess APIs. The blogging
application was developed in-house and represents a typical
web application with need for providing access control to its
users [3]. We also integrated our framework into a popular
open-source wikipedia application [1].
Our system shows promise in supporting potentially valu-
able future access control models that could be targeted by
individual users to control access to their data. Since no
change is required to deploy a new model after the one-time
installation of our framework, any future models chosen by
the users can be easily integrated to any web application.
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APPENDIX
A. SET OF XACCESS APIS
API Description
filterString(seekerID, ownerID, string) filters the string text according to the access control model
of ownerID to give assess to seekerID
isAccessAllowed(seekerID, ownerID, op) verifies if seekerID is allowed to perform the operation op
on ownerID’s data
setSubjectRole(ownerID, userID, role) assigns the role for userID in ownerID’s list
setObjectRole(ownerID, objectID, role) assigns the role for objectID in ownerID’s list
setRoleHierarchy(ownerID, roleHierarchy) updates the role hierarchy for ownerID on the web server
Table 2: Set of xAccess APIs for integrating the generic access control model.
